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7
8 An adequate epistemology of science will not, as some Old Deferentialists expected
9 [pre-Kuhnian thinkers who held that science progresses by the accumulation of well-
10 confirmed truths], be exclusively logical, but will have a social dimension. Unlike the
11 New Cynicism [of post-Kuhnian critics who write about science with factitious
12 despair], however, it will not see the fact that science is a social enterprise as
13 illegitimating its epistemic pretensions, but as an important factor contributing to its
14 epistemic distinction; not as a reason for favoring the notion of acceptance and
15 neglecting warrant, but as an important factor helping to keep warrant and accep-
16 tance appropriately correlated. Puzzling out science, Susan Haack (1995, p. 27).
17 This paper is a rejoinder to the three forum pieces stimulated by our original article in this
18 journal: ‘Scepticism and doubt in science and science education: the complexity of global
19 warming as a socio-scientific issue’ (Bryce and Day 2014). The articles by Colucci-Gray
20 (2014), by Fensham (2014) and by dos Santos (2014), confirm the priority we attach to
21 teaching about global warming at the present time and, in particular, the importance of
22 developing rational scepticism in secondary school students while they learn about science.
23 In providing additional thoughts as how best to achieve scientific literacy, the articles bring
24 in further complications, adding to the debate and to the challenges for practitioners as they
25 consider practicable classroom activities. As with scientists concerned about anthropogenic
26 global warming (AGW), where there is a consensus of opinion but far from full agreement
27 about what is happening and what should be done, educational researchers share some, but
28 not all, of their thinking about how the complexities in the science can be most usefully
29 handled by teachers. In the light of the comments, this rejoinder identifies areas where we
30 seem to agree but focuses mainly upon those where there is dispute or difference in
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31 emphasis. In the case of the latter, we make suggestions as to how these differences might
32 be resolved. Where we feel that there has been some misrepresentation of our original
33 arguments, we respectfully offer clarification and correction.
34 Support for rational scepticism as an important goal in science education
35 Colucci-Gray’s position
36 Colucci-Gray (2014) is supportive of our stress on developing scepticism and considers
37 that its development in school science education should be further extended beyond
38 micro-scepticism ‘‘to foster dialogical exchanges across different ideas of development
39 and worldviews’’ (p. 644). Influenced by the writings of Jasanoff (2004, 2005, 2012), she
40 strengthens her point by emphasising that the lives and actions of human beings are
41 inseparable from the knowledge which scientists have accumulated about the world we
42 live in (and live on). Thus, it is only right that matters of serious societal concern, such
43 as global warming, be dealt with in schools. The truthfulness of evidence must then
44 figure as part of any learning about what scientists report as their findings. She correctly
45 points out that this requires an appropriate framing of what constitutes evidence. For
46 Colucci-Gray, science teaching must contribute to ‘transformative citizenship’; it must
47 play its part in how we square privileged (scientific/technical) knowledge with public
48 concerns about the outcomes and implications of scientific investigation. And so she
49 reasons that the science that is presented in schools must meet the challenges posed by
50 sustainability, biotechnology, genetic modification, and so forth, and reflect open-
51 mindedness and shared honesty, as we argued in Bryce and Day (2014). Whereas our
52 article tends to concentrate on the methodologies and the metrics of climate change,
53 Colucci-Gray’s paper tends to emphasise ‘‘the inherently complex nature of real-life
54 contexts and which escape[s] the grasp of the scientific, analytical view’’ (p. 636). In her
55 analysis, the inevitable reductionism in scientific approaches always risks the omission of
56 factors important to humans and particular communities because of that complexity. The
57 reductionism also means that any adopted scientific method sets boundaries upon what is
58 not being considered at any one time. Humility and ethical reasoning are frequent
59 casualties; cultural issues are neglected whereas biophysical concerns tend to dominate;
60 that which is not quantifiable is obscured; she argues. If the distant future is about geo-
61 engineering on a global scale, then political debate will become incredibly complex and
62 life changing as we know it.
63 Thus school science needs to be reconsidered carefully and Colucci-Gray welcomes our
64 recommendations concerning the merits of cooperative learning as a pedagogic approach.
65 She emphasises, understandably, that teaching about global warming should not replace
66 attention to other concerns about the surroundings in which we live; specific and localised
67 environmental concerns must be addressed too. And she widens the whole debate about
68 what education in school needs to consider, matters which, broadly speaking, could be
69 described as being socio-political in character and which constitute the core of citizenship
70 education. Citing Jasanoff (2005), Colucci-Gray pointedly states: ‘‘The challenge of
71 making wise decisions in the face of uncertainty lies at the interface between ethics,
72 politics and science’’ (p. 642). The papers by Fensham (2014) and dos Santos (2014)
73 similarly stress this, particularly the latter, and so we need to look at it closely. First,
74 however, we should consider Fensham’s reaction to our paper.
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75 Fensham’s position
76 Fensham also strongly supports our arguments for the teaching of global warming at the
77 present time (and other issues where socio-scientific controversies arise—as do we). But
78 for him: ‘‘It is only in relation to emerging and uncertain scientific contexts that students
79 should be taught about scepticism’’. He presses for scepticism to be balanced with trust in
80 science, that trust to be an ‘‘active intellectual dependence’’, meriting in his eyes an equal
81 emphasis in teaching about science—indeed as an ‘‘antidote’’. Students should ‘‘learn
82 when and why to trust science’’ (p. 649). He considers that (using the terms of Kurtz and
83 Snowden’s Cynefin framework) the scientific knowledge of simple and complicated
84 contexts where established laws hold—including inter-disciplinary knowledge—should be
85 free of scepticism during instruction; for him it is ‘‘inappropriate’’. For the science of
86 complex contexts where there are varying degrees of uncertainty, scepticism ‘‘needs to be
87 actively included’’. It is tempting to say that we agree here, and throughout the working
88 day perceptive science teachers must nuance their instruction accordingly: sometimes
89 taking the conventional line and conveying that ‘this is how it is’; at other times
90 emphasising scientific uncertainty, scientists’ tentative thinking and the disagreements
91 among experts. The difficulty is that, according to research findings which we discussed in
92 Bryce and Day (2014) and in Bryce (2010), very many teachers are not so inclined to be
93 flexible in how they go about teaching; the conventional line on what science is and is
94 about (Roberts Vision I literacy at best) dominates and effectively pre-empts any alter-
95 natives (Roberts Vision II literacy). Only with a commitment to pedagogies appropriate to
96 science ‘where uncertainty holds’, to cite Fensham’s use of the Cynefin framework, will
97 teaching be effective. There are plenty of examples to choose from as the literature
98 indicates. Fensham adds to the ones we identified and highlights those where the deliberate
99 promotion of doubt and an anti-science stance is deployed to confuse the public (and to
100 which he says we only make oblique reference).
101 The precautionary principle
102 Fensham chides us for not making an explicit reference to The Precautionary Principle
103 published by UNESCO in 2005, for he sees it as a re-wording of the importance of
104 scientific scepticism and how it should be used by scientists. We certainly explained what
105 the IPCC was charged to tackle in respect of global warming, all of its reports explicitly
106 looking at AGW and therefore predicated on precaution. Perhaps more significantly, we
107 would observe that the final sections of the UNESCO (2005) report concerned with ‘Social
108 and cultural implications’ are strikingly scant about education and the schooling of future
109 scientists and citizens. There were evidently no deliberations amongst the writers of that
110 report about how future scientists might be taught—despite the ‘E’ in UNESCO and ‘the
111 ethics of scientific knowledge’ being in the subtitle of the report!
112 Focusing more specifically on interpretations of the precautionary principle, it is
113 interesting to note that it is by no means universally accepted within the scientific com-
114 munity where it has been criticized on grounds that it is conceptually ill defined (Sandin
115 et al. 2002); theoretically incoherent (Peterson 2006); potentially absolutist in nature
116 (Nollkaemper 1996); largely based around value judgments (Charnley 2000); potentially
117 leads to increased risk-taking (Sandin et al. 2002); and is unscientific and could lead to the
118 marginalizing of science (Gray and Bewers 1996). The precautionary principle has become
119 something of a mantra of the environmentalist movement, which leaves it open to claims
120 that it is a ‘political’ principle rather than one which is scientifically based.
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121 The problem with invoking the precautionary principle is neatly summed up by Henk
122 van der Belt (2003) when he suggests that,
123 … many environmentalists… believe that we possess a decision rule or principle for
124 dealing with fundamental scientific uncertainty that is itself not the least uncertain.
125 That rule is the PP [precautionary principle]. Thus, in almost any debate, it seems
126 that the PP can be brought in as a trump card to override all other considerations and
127 arguments. But what exactly is the PP? (p. 1123) [emphasis added].
128 While we certainly accept that the precautionary principle is, as its proponents assert,
129 already ‘‘enshrined’’ in such international agreements as the Convention on Biological
130 Diversity and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, it could be argued that existing
131 definitions are at best partial or incomplete, and at worst, fail to spell out the precise
132 conditions that require to be fulfilled before it may be invoked or clearly specifies the
133 nature of the preventative action that has to be taken (van der Belt 2003, p. 1123).
134 The general appeal of the principle makes it a natural candidate for political consensus
135 among a public otherwise deeply divided about environmental policies. Furthermore,
136 adherents to the precautionary principle tend to subscribe to the view that governments
137 around the world should take precautions to protect public health and the environment, even
138 in the absence of clear evidence of harm as a consequence, and notwithstanding the costs of
139 such action. In the case of climate change it could be argued that the annual costs involved
140 with the application of such a ‘political’ principle could inflict significant damage to the
141 economies of the developed and developing nations since the proscribed solution would
142 involve governments spending enormous sums of public money to mitigate the effects of
143 climate change (in the case of developed nations) and could deprive developing countries of
144 the means by which they might increase the rate of their economic development.
145 However, a worrying perspective on the precautionary principle has emerged recently,
146 which advocates a shift in the burden of proof toward those who advocate a new science
147 and technology or activity. Reversing the burden of proof amounts to substituting the
148 maxim ‘‘guilty until proven innocent’’ for the age-old legal principle ‘‘innocent until
149 proven guilty’’ (van der Belt 2003, p. 1125). Even more worrying is the call by Kevin
150 Trenberth (a leading climate scientist and IPCC author) that in the case of climate science,
151 ‘‘Given that global warming is ‘‘unequivocal’’, and is ‘‘very likely’’ due to human activ-
152 ities, to quote the 2007 IPCC report, the null hypothesis should now be reversed, thereby
153 placing the burden of proof on showing that there is no human influence’’ (Trenberth
154 2011).
155 Trenberth’s argument for reversing the burden of proof hinges on whether the IPCC’s
156 evidence and arguments meet an appropriate standard of proof, which in Bryce and Day
157 (2014) we suggest is far from scientifically unproblematic (or, it could be argued, ethical).
158 The commonly used levels of proof are the preponderance of evidence, clear and con-
159 vincing evidence, and beyond reasonable doubt. If science is to carry on testing hypotheses
160 (as it undoubtedly will), what of Trenberth’s suggestion that we should assume human
161 influence unless proved otherwise? It is doubtful that his argument would find much
162 support within the wider scientific community. The key point missed by Trenberth is that
163 while human influence may now be ‘playing some role’ in the rise of global temperatures,
164 the incidence of intense storms is likely to decrease, not increase, by the late twenty-first
165 century, according to the computer simulations carried out by Zahn and Storch (2010).
166 North Atlantic polar lows should become less frequent, not more frequent, if and as global
167 temperatures rise. Only when the signal of anthropogenic influence on extreme weather
168 becomes overwhelming (which looks to be some way off at present) will it make sense to
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169 assume human influence has increased the odds of any weather event that occurs (Allen
170 2011).
171 What is particularly worrying about Trenberth’s train of thought is that it highlights that
172 some climate scientists (alarmists) consider that climate science is somehow different from
173 the rest of science, believing that in the name of precaution, they can turn 400 years of
174 scientific thought on its head.
175 Which brings us back to the question of how best to discuss the precautionary principle
176 with students and how we teach our students to trust scientists? Are we really to accept the
177 precautionary principle at face value? Should we present the precautionary principle to our
178 students as if it is unproblematic? While we agree that teachers ought to discuss the
179 precautionary principle as part of classroom discussions on climate change, we would
180 suggest that, if introduced uncritically, it might possibly present more problems since it
181 could be used to close down discussion rather than promote open debate. As for teaching
182 our students to ‘trust’ scientists, the above example shows that the politically motivated
183 views of some climate scientists make it difficult for science teachers to present the climate
184 science (and several climate scientists) as trustworthy, hence our suggestion that science
185 teachers need to carefully educate their students to critically scrutinize the science for
186 confirmation bias as well as political motivation.
187 IPCC’s fourth and fifth reports (AR4 and AR5)
188 Most interestingly, Fensham states that the very recent fifth report of the IPCC (which
189 came out after our paper was published) ‘‘answers many of [our] concerns about climate
190 change’’. Our article had looked closely at the fourth IPCC report (AR4) of 2007. This
191 raises two observations immediately. First, it is indeed striking how different the reports
192 are in style and presentation. The more recent report (2013) is much more upfront and
193 explicit on the extent of the confidence which can be placed on predictions of climatic
194 change rates. Caution and scepticism is the order of the day (with forecasts worsening on
195 the whole). Second, summaries and reports for policy makers are also now very promi-
196 nent—and fairly comprehensible; the sense of a wide readership is much greater than
197 before. In that regard, the sceptics among the public and in scientific communities would
198 seem to have been influential in the intervening 6 years: much more is now demanded of
199 scientists regarding what and how they report. Sceptical scientists haven’t gone away of
200 course and it is interesting that when the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
201 (IPCC) consensus published that 5th report (AR5), there appeared a counter-consensus
202 publication from the NIPCC (the Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate
203 Change). [One is tempted to ask whether the rather similar title/acronym was used to
204 confuse the careless journalist.] More seriously, the contents of the two reports are very
205 different. The main difference between AR5 and the NIPCC report is that they come to
206 opposing conclusions using largely similar evidence but, in the case of the NIPCC report,
207 with less politically emotive, more scientifically nuanced language.
208 Looking specifically at the level of certainty expressed within the science portrayed
209 within the AR5, Daniel Botkin who testified before the US house sub-committee on
210 science, space, and technology on May 29, 2014 drew attention to the view that
211 … both the reports [IPPC AR5 and the US National Climate Assessment] present a
212 number of speculative, and sometimes incomplete, conclusions embedded in lan-
213 guage that gives them more scientific heft than they deserve. The reports are ‘‘sci-
214 entific-sounding’’ rather than based on clearly settled facts or admitting their lack.
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215 Established facts about the global environment exist less often in science than lay-
216 men usually think… The rate of change we are experiencing is also not unprece-
217 dented, and the ‘‘mystery’’ of the warming ‘‘plateau’’ simply indicates the inherent
218 complexity of our global biosphere. Change is normal, life on Earth is inherently
219 risky; it always has been. The two reports, however, make it seem that environmental
220 change is apocalyptic and irreversible. It is not (Botkin 2014).
221 Fensham’s suggestion that the latest IPCC report answers our concerns seems not to be
222 borne out by the evidence, since AR5 plays down recently published research which
223 clearly shows that there has been a ‘pause’ in warming since the turn of the twenty-first
224 century despite the unprecedented increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. As we
225 point out in our original article, this ‘pause’ has been discussed in the literature since 2011
226 (Kaufmann et al. 2011), and was recently highlighted in an article in Nature (Tollefson
227 2014), yet the summary for policy-makers for AR5 makes little mention of it. Why is this
228 the case? Is it because the IPCC feels the needs to present the science as ‘unequivocal’ and
229 in agreement with the consensus view held by the environmentalist message in order to
230 persuade the world’s politicians? Possibly, but it is more likely that the IPCC is still
231 plagued by the belief that humans are the main cause of climate change, at the expense of
232 objectively examining the peer-reviewed scientific literature from the perspective of the
233 original hypothesis.
234 Mini-scientists and the education of future citizens
235 A point important to Fensham is his stress upon the educational goal of producing science-
236 informed citizens, seeing this as preferable to the goal of producing mini-scientists. He
237 sees the former as more realistic and the latter is what he seems to consider is our goal for
238 secondary students. This juxtaposition needs some unpicking. We have no disagreement
239 about science-informed citizenry; indeed our entire paper centres on what should be
240 achieved for all students through the study of science with that as a main goal. However,
241 reducing our emphasis upon investigative activities concerned with climate change to the
242 placing of students in the role of mini-scientists, as that term has traditionally been
243 understood, misses the point. The research we have personally conducted (see Day and
244 Bryce 2011, 2012) has been with teachers implementing cooperative learning incorpo-
245 rating both practical lab work research and internet and textbook searches in order to
246 combine the ‘learning of science, the learning to do science, and the learning about
247 science’. What these lessons achieve unites the introduction of young students to practical
248 experimentation with their learning about what scientists in the field in question are
249 reporting—corroborations, conflicts, and so forth. They generate real time discussion
250 where the teacher can respond to student queries and debate. Following in-depth interviews
251 with these teachers, we could readily detect that the emphasis of their discussions was to
252 ‘practice democratic citizenship’ (of the five evident purposes across the sample ques-
253 tioned). This was in contrast to humanities teachers whose emphases for their classroom
254 discussions were concerned with the development of reasoning skills and open-ended
255 enquiry. For us, putting students in the role of mini-scientists means with a necessarily
256 contemporary meaning of the word ‘scientist’, one whose commitments are to peers, the
257 public and communities, as well as to the subject matter itself. Thus we do not see mini-
258 scientists/science-informed citizens as ‘alternative images’ for school science, as does
259 Fensham. These should be complementary images and we would argue enable a workable
260 balance of ‘collegial trust’ and ‘scientific scepticism’ to be achieved in practice, targets
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261 which Fensham seems to regard as better achieved through the analysis of suitable dramas
262 enacted for the purposes of educating science-informed citizens.
263 It is important to note that Scottish science education, which is the cultural environment
264 from which we hail, is undergoing a series of curricular and structural reforms under the
265 auspices of a ‘Curriculum for Excellence’. As part of this reform, the purpose of science
266 education has been re-oriented away from the traditional goal of science education for the
267 production of future scientists (the ‘pipeline’ view) towards the development of students as
268 scientifically literate citizens (Day and Bryce 2013). However, this re-orientation has not
269 translated—so far—into the desired shift in science teachers’ thinking about the purpose of
270 science education, mostly due to the fact that the documents issued to them identifying the
271 ‘principles and practice’ and ‘experiences and outcomes’ and used by them to focus the
272 content and context of what they teach, have continued to focus on the learning of and the
273 learning to do science, to the detriment of learning about science and its relationship with
274 society.
275 While we wholeheartedly subscribe to the goal of developing students as scientifically
276 literate citizens (particularly the vision II orientation towards scientific literacy), we also
277 recognize that the prevailing culture of Scottish science teachers currently subscribes to the
278 traditional ‘pipeline ‘view of the goal for science education. In Bryce and Day (2014), we
279 present our analysis in a manner that would be accessible for science teachers regardless of
280 their alignment with a vision I or vision II orientation towards scientific literacy. But we
281 focus our analysis more on the development of critical awareness in the development of
282 students’ scientific literacy rather than placing students in the role of mini-scientists as
283 Fensham suggests.
284 dos Santos’s position
285 The article by dos Santos (2014) indicates strong support for the thrust of our paper. He
286 welcomes the discussion of climate change in school science and illustrates answers to our
287 three research questions by reference to recent investigations of his own in Brazil. He too
288 found that students were not inclined to be sceptical in the course of their normal science
289 studies and required to be taught ‘‘how to detect bias in scientific claims’’ (p. 667). In the
290 research he describes, students were exposed to biased, alarmist newspaper reports and
291 individual students’ points of view regarding the political context of the climate change
292 debate were made explicit. Thus he concludes that classroom discussion of the political
293 issues surrounding global warming should take place in science. We object to one point
294 which is repeated several times by the author: that is the assertion that we somehow
295 confined our analysis to ‘confirmation bias’. We most certainly discussed it in relation to
296 research and thinking, and in some detail, both in general and in relation to what is evident
297 amongst climate researchers. And we also discussed related issues like conflicting evidence
298 and alternative perspectives on how data might be analysed. But we don’t ‘‘propose
299 confirmation bias’’ (as per his abstract), nor, in conveying the scientific view, do we
300 ‘‘reduce the discussion of global warming issues to the confirmation bias and the con-
301 ceptual understanding of the controversy’’ (p. 672). Perhaps something has been lost in the
302 translation from Portuguese to English here and dos Santos only means to seek a widening
303 of the debate to include political issues more thoroughly. If so, he could have made explicit
304 concessions to our analysis of both the public and the political debates (including, for
305 example, the climate-gate affairs). The serious challenge however is how science teachers
306 might be persuaded to bring socio-political issues into their lessons, given all the rather
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307 negative research findings which have been published in the last ten years or so concerning
308 what science teachers are disposed to do.
309 As a point of clarification, we suggest that as part of students’ development towards
310 becoming more critically aware (in our view a vital component of students’ developing
311 scientific literacy), science teachers need to support students’ learning towards being able
312 to identify and reason through potentially biased information, whether it is political,
313 ideological or, in the case of some scientists, confirmation bias. We would suggest that this
314 perspective aligns well with the development of students’ socio-scientific reasoning as
315 suggested by Sadler, Barab, and Scott (2007). In addition, the main thrust of our argument
316 is for the maintenance of the discussion’s complexity rather than its reduction to a trite
317 sequence of activities designed to reduce the learning process to thinking skills required to
318 identify confirmation bias.
319 Political literacy and scientific literacy?
320 Whilst we agree with dos Santos’s suggestion that students ought to take into account
321 different political perspectives during any discussion in the global warming debate, we
322 would argue that the co-development of students’ political literacy, in conjunction with
323 scientific literacy, requires science teachers to be clear (conceptually) as to what constitutes
324 political literacy. They need also to be able to recognise which elements of any such
325 discussion relate specifically to its development. We would argue that the term political
326 literacy is itself somewhat ill defined and concur with the view that it extends beyond
327 merely acquiring knowledge and understanding of the political system (Eurydice 2012) and
328 the party political dogma of the political class of the nation (whatever nation that might
329 be).
330 Sir Bernard Crick has suggested that ‘political literacy’ was a term invented to mean
331 that someone should have the knowledge, skills and values to be effective in public life
332 (Crick 2007). The challenge is to help students to read issues and events from a political
333 perspective. That involves students knowing where, when and how decisions are made in
334 society—at the local, national and international level; recognising one’s right to be per-
335 sonally involved with the issues under discussion; being familiar with a range of political
336 ideas, language and forms of argument; developing a personal set of political values, while
337 having the skills and confidence to apply them in practice; being able to engage effectively
338 in dialogue with others on issues of shared political concern. In essence, we suggest that
339 this view of political literacy aligns relatively well with Roberts’ (2007) vision II orien-
340 tation for scientific literacy in that:
341 … Vision II derives its meaning from the character of situations with a scientific
342 component, situations that students are likely to encounter as citizens. At the
343 extreme, this vision can be called literacy (again, read thorough knowledgeability)
344 about science related situations in which considerations other than science have an
345 important place at the table (Sadler and Zeidler 2009, p. 730, emphases in the
346 original).
347 Furthermore, we would also concur with Sadler and Zeidler when they suggest that ‘‘…
348 vision II Scientific Literacy moves away from prioritizing decontextualized science
349 concepts and focuses instead on understandings and use of science in situations removed
350 from traditional boundaries of science… [and] emphasizes an approach that is broader in
351 scope, involving personal decision-making about contextually embedded issues’’ (p. 910).
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352 The three responses to our original article underline the challenges which the classroom
353 discussion of climate change raises for science teachers. While we have commented on
354 them and ‘science for citizenship’ in places throughout this rejoinder, several points merit
355 further examination. Of interest is a recent paper by Guerin, van der Ploeg and Sins (2013)
356 which critically evaluates the mainstream conceptualisation of citizenship education,
357 internationally and amongst the countries of Europe in particular, noting the stress that is
358 placed on active forms of participation, that being both a goal and an effective teaching
359 approach across the curriculum. It has been repeatedly found that teachers lack the
360 knowledge to teach ‘‘political concepts such as equity, freedom, [to] sustainable devel-
361 opment, human rights and all kinds of socially relevant issues’’ (p. 437); and that pupils
362 find it difficult to learn the critical thinking skills involved. The discomfort that science
363 teachers express in discussing socio-scientific issues has been pointed out by us in previous
364 articles (see Day and Bryce 2011; Bryce and Gray 2004). Guerin et al. make a strong plea
365 for improved, relevant teacher education and point out that schools can contribute to the
366 development of students’ political literacy in two ways. Firstly, through the development
367 of an integrated curriculum since these themes are not limited to one knowledge domain
368 but involve the use of different kinds of knowledge and the organisation of interdisci-
369 plinary learning activities. Secondly, teachers have to possess the knowledge and skills
370 required to teach such issues and the ability to challenge students to take different per-
371 spectives on them. They suggest, and we would agree, that this last aspect requires (sci-
372 ence) teachers to possess an elaborate epistemological knowledge, including insight into
373 the limits of knowledge in various different disciplines such as ethics, economy and history
374 (as well as an understanding of what amounts to sound evidence in each of these disci-
375 plines in order to teach students to understand the relevant knowledge relating to the issue).
376 We would question whether it is reasonable to expect or assume that all science teachers
377 have developed such a wide and sophisticated ontological/epistemological perspective.
378 Drawing on several empirical studies primarily focused on citizenship education, Gu-
379 erin et al. (2013) show that teachers lack the necessary specific knowledge of the economy,
380 politics and even of government or European issues in order to teach these broad themes;
381 they also lack knowledge of instructional strategies on how to deal with these complexities;
382 or are simply not at ease to discuss controversial issues (Keating et al. 2009). Using Oulton
383 et al. (2004) as an example, they suggest that only 12 % of the teachers felt adequately
384 prepared to teach controversial issues, due to a lack of training and guidelines. In a
385 longitudinal study conducted by Keating et al. (2009), teachers mentioned the fact that
386 active pedagogical techniques were time-consuming activities. Guerin et al. (2013) go
387 further by suggesting that it is not only within citizenship education that the teaching of
388 controversial issues is delicate; and they acknowledge what it means in science education.
389 A large body of science educational research emphasises the fact that most science teachers
390 are not at ease in teaching socio-scientific controversial issues due to, on the one hand, a
391 lack of knowledge and on the other a lack of practicable educational approaches (Bryce
392 and Gray 2004; Day and Bryce 2011).
393 In the Scottish context, as a consequence of the lack of an integrated curriculum in
394 secondary education and the current general feeling among Scottish science teachers of
395 being under-prepared to discuss complex issues such as climate change, when such dis-
396 cussions do take place they are dealt with on a superficial level. Potentially this gives rise
397 to the adoption of naive beliefs about how to deal with and resolve such matters. When
398 dealing with them, the pitfall of limiting teaching to the micro level, i.e. teaching students
399 how to reduce their ecological footprint or adopting good ecological behaviours, should be
400 minimised because solutions to many ecological problems, such as climate change, may
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401 only be found at the macro level: new regulations and new technologies are required.
402 Helping students to discern what can be tackled at both the micro level and macro level is
403 necessary, we would suggest. One of the goals for developing students’ scientific literacy
404 should be preparing them in a step-by-step manner to deal with the complexity and con-
405 troversy of different kinds of issues in an open, balanced and unbiased manner. This would
406 mean providing science teachers with professional support and the tools required to teach
407 such controversial socio-scientific issues. Giving students a realistic view also involves
408 teaching them that these issues require active engagement and effort on their part, over
409 time, with the application of critical thinking skills.
410 Science teacher identity
411 While we have welcomed this opportunity to discuss some of the interesting perspectives
412 thrown up by the forum pieces generated by our original article, it is incumbent upon us to
413 discuss why most science teachers are resistant to the notion of teaching science from a
414 more humanistic perspective. One of us has argued that such resistance is an endemic and
415 persistent feature of university scientists as well as school science teachers (Bryce 2010).
416 What lies at the heart of this resistance is the nature of science teacher identity.
417 Teacher identity is complex in that it is influenced by temporal and transient events in
418 an individual’s life. It can fluctuate over time under the influence of factors which are
419 internal (emotions, mood or attitude) and external (job and life experiences) to the indi-
420 vidual (Beauchamp and Thomas 2009). This complexity is further compounded by the
421 makeup of teachers’ collective conceptualisations of their specialized expertise. The
422 interactions between teachers’ professional and personal identities impact heavily upon the
423 decisions made when teachers are planning lessons involving socio-scientific discussion
424 and how they choose to organise the science classroom. These interactions are emergent
425 from, and influenced by, immediate context; prior conceptualisations of self (teachers
426 seeing themselves as scientists who teach rather than as educators of young people); social
427 positioning; epistemological perspectives on the nature of science; and awareness of what
428 is, or can be, personal proficiency. Each of these is a fluid and dynamic construct (Olsen
429 2008). From the socio-cultural perspective, teacher identity is both a product—a result of
430 internal and external influences—and a process: an on-going series of interactions during
431 the professional learning of the individual.
432 Focusing more specifically on why there is resistance to more humanistic forms of
433 science education (as exemplified through the discussion of climate change and global
434 warming), it is tempting to suggest that science teachers’ present professional identity is at
435 odds with the type of professional identity we would like to them to develop and adopt.
436 Teachers’ epistemological perspectives on science heavily influence their professional
437 identity, as do their interactions with other science teachers: the enculturation into the sub-
438 culture of science teachers is particularly powerful. Those who perceive socio-scientific
439 discussion as part of a fact driven, epistemological hierarchy, where science knowledge is
440 the dominant form of wisdom required to negotiate the way forward (and classroom
441 discussion is simply ‘‘an add-on, should time permit’’), are less likely to engage in relevant
442 pedagogical debate—with each other and with their students.
443 In addition, other factors affecting their approach to socio-scientific discussion include
444 their understanding of the role that science plays within modern society. This impacts
445 strongly on their perceptions of the goals of science education (the development of sci-
446 entifically literate citizens or the training of future generations of scientists) and how they
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447 view their own role towards fulfilling that goal. If most science teachers favour the view
448 that the aim is to maintain the pipeline (which seems to be the case, at least in Scotland),
449 then it is little wonder that most science teachers shy away from socio-scientific discussion
450 (Gray and Bryce 2006). Such teaching requires a less authoritative, more open classroom
451 discourse and a pedagogy which conflicts with their core professional identity. Our worry
452 is that if, as dos Santos suggests, we are to throw the development of political literacy into
453 the mix, we run the risk of adding a dimension that most science teachers will see as being
454 in direct conflict with their chosen role. At best this might lead to superficial engagement
455 with socio-scientific discussion and with political literacy specifically or, at worst, could
456 lead to the complete alienation of socio-scientific discussion altogether. Colucci-Gray’s
457 (2014) analysis, in seeking deep engagement with socio-scientific ideas, focuses upon the
458 imperative of both scientists and science teachers upholding the virtue of cooperation: ‘‘…
459 a sceptical attitude and a form of education based on cooperation can go some way towards
460 enabling students to critically appraise technological innovation’’ (p. 644). But it should
461 (and must) extend student learning in practical ways—and thus the actions of key players
462 in the global warming debate must be grappled with. For her, by implication, science
463 teacher identity is rooted in their own personal scientific education (what science means for
464 them) and their professional preparation to teach.
465 As we see it currently, a pervasive problem emerges from the undergraduate back-
466 ground of science teachers, this being that many lack the ability to critically examine
467 research papers in their own fields with a proper degree of scepticism. They tend to
468 uncritically accept scientific research findings as fact (and indeed the scientific view as
469 incontrovertible) by paying undue deference to the scientific researcher’s authority. If this
470 overt ‘trust’ in scientists (c.f. Fensham’s argument alluded to earlier in this paper) persists
471 into teacher education and science teachers’ practice then this can lead to a cursory
472 engagement in socio-scientific discussion, one that is closed, uncritical and potentially
473 biased; one which, as Susan Haack (1995) suggests, follows the ‘Old Deferentialist’
474 expectation that science is objective, logical and without regard for its social dimension. As
475 we argued in Day and Bryce (2011), any hope for the encouragement of a socio-political
476 dimension in the teaching of socio-scientific issues in a critical, unbiased and open manner
477 requires a paradigm shift in science teachers’ thinking.
478 The quotation from Haack (1995) which we cited at the start of this article emphasises
479 the importance of keeping scientific warrant (the evidential basis for any scientific claim)
480 and societal acceptance (the standing of any claim in the eyes of the wider community)
481 ‘‘appropriately correlated’’ in our recognition of what constitutes science. In her discussion,
482 Haack then describes her ideal of scientists:
483 a scientific community of creative and careful enquirers, with adequate resources of
484 equipment and time, all sincerely seeking the truth and unaffected by prejudice, and
485 each making his work freely available to the scrutiny of others, who would thereby
486 be enabled to build on what is solid and to correct what is not. For that would be a
487 community in which creativity in hypothesis and care in seeking out and assessing
488 the worth of evidence—the twin desiderata imposed by the dual goal of enquiry—
489 were maximized (p. 27).
490 With appropriate guidance and support, science teachers have the potential to give young
491 students an appreciation of the work of such people. And, should some of these students be
492 inspired and capable, teachers should be able to direct their specialist studies to enable
493 them to so participate in ensuing scientific careers.
494
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